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understand technological innovation as a poetic, participa-
tive, and performative process, then bringing together tech-
nological innovation and artistic practices should not be 
seen as a marginal or luxury project but instead as one that 
is central, necessary, and vital for cultural-technological 
change. This conceptualization supports not only a different 
approach to innovation but has also social-transformative 
potential and has implications for ethics of technology and 
responsible innovation.
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1  Introduction: the gap between technological 
innovation and art, and the idea of technological 
innovation as design
In the past decades, artists have used all kinds of new tech-
nologies to create their art. Many artists integrate the meth-
ods of art and the methods of science. Moreover, there are 
more research projects and businesses now that link tech-
nological innovation to art. Art and technology labs are 
set up at art institutions and universities. Some of them 
have been around for a while, such as the MIT Media Lab 
and the Ars Electronica FutureLab. There is growing dis-
course on transdisciplinary and even ‘antidisciplinarity’ 
(Oxman 2016), and there is more interest in practice-led 
research which may include, for instance, the performance 
of images, sound, and code rather than only doing things 
with numbers or words (Haseman 2006). Inside and outside 
academia, there is also more attention to craft work and 
craft culture, which also links art, science, innovation, and 
design. Consider for instance fab labs, which enable DIY 
Abstract Usually technological innovation and artistic 
work are seen as very distinctive practices, and innovation 
of technologies is understood in terms of design and human 
intention. Moreover, thinking about technological innova-
tion is usually categorized as “technical” and disconnected 
from thinking about culture and the social. Drawing on 
work by Dewey, Heidegger, Latour, and Wittgenstein and 
responding to academic discourses about craft and design, 
ethics and responsible innovation, transdisciplinarity, 
and participation, this essay questions these assumptions 
and examines what kind of knowledge and practices are 
involved in art and technological innovation. It argues that 
technological innovation is indeed “technical”, but, if con-
ceptualized as techne, can be understood as art and perfor-
mance. It is argued that in practice, innovative techne is not 
only connected to episteme as theoretical knowledge but 
also has the mode of poiesis: it is not just the outcome of 
human design and intention but rather involves a performa-
tive process in which there is a “dialogue” between form 
and matter and between creator and environment in which 
humans and non-humans participate. Moreover, this art is 
embedded in broader cultural patterns and grammars—ulti-
mately a ‘form of life’—that shape and make possible the 
innovation. In that sense, there is no gap between science 
and society—a gap that is often assumed in STS and in, 
for instance, discourse on responsible innovation. It is con-
cluded that technology and art were only relatively recently 
and unfortunately divorced, conceptually, but that in prac-
tices and performances they were always linked. If we 
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digital fabrication or the current interest in craft culture in 
architecture (e.g. Francisco 2007). This development has 
a long history which in modern times goes back to, for 
instance, the Arts and Crafts movement in the nineteenth 
century; it is also connected to a history of discourses about 
these practices (Lees-Maffei and Sandino 2004).
However, that such developments, collaborations, and 
cross-overs are presented as new or exceptional is only 
possible on the basis of a widely shared assumption in aca-
demia and in the general public that previously and even 
today these are two very distinct domains with distinct 
methodologies. More generally, in modern society science 
and culture are seen as separate areas, and this assump-
tion continues to exert its influence on the way we organ-
ize knowledge and innovation practices. For instance, in 
academia, the study of nature (natural sciences) is still 
largely disconnected from the study of culture (humani-
ties and social sciences). Academic programmes that con-
nect both domains are still the exception. And even today, 
often science is still seen (by many philosophers and oth-
ers) as objective and detached, directed towards the uni-
versal, whereas art is seen as subjective and engaged, 
directed towards the particular. Technological innovation, 
then, is supposed to follow the methods of science rather 
than art, or at least to draw on knowledge established by 
the sciences. (In this understanding, engineering is seen as 
applied science.)
Furthermore, thinking about technological innovation in 
the context of engineering and product development—my 
focus here is on the technological innovation as invention 
rather than economic innovation in the sense of finding 
new markets and business opportunities1—is often guided 
by the view that it is about “design”, in the sense of ideas 
and concepts that are then materialized. It is about humans 
having ideas that then form matter or even create some-
thing entirely new that did not exist before. Innovation 
brings in the new. But what is new? A concept, a model, a 
form. What matters is a new idea. Similarly, in contempo-
rary art it is often assumed that the artist needs to have a 
“concept”, which then is materialized in objects, installa-
tions, etc.
This conception of innovation and invention seems to 
be somewhat similar to the ancient mythologies (e.g. in 
Mesopotamia or in ancient Greece) in which a god or gods 
act upon existing matter or even create ex nihilo—Gene-
sis 1:1 is often interpreted as such. What matters in these 
accounts, it seems, is the concept held by the creator, which 
1 For instance, Garcia and Calantone (2002) define innovation as ‘an 
iterative process initiated by the perception of a new market and/or 
new service opportunity for a technology-based invention which leads 
to development, production, and marketing tasks striving for the com-
mercial success of the invention.’ (p. 112).
is then materialized. It also reminds us of the Platonic fig-
ure of the demiurge, the craftsman who created the physical 
universe out of created or uncreated matter. In the Timaeus, 
Plato sees the demiurge as someone who has a concept and 
then uses that to shape matter. However, here there is no 
modern conception of art as the expression of the artist, or 
the idea that the artist invents something entirely new; at 
this point, the idea is still that the artist uses a pre-existing 
form which is then imposed on formless, orderless matter. 
In this pre-modern approach, there is already an eternal 
form, a model. In any case, regardless of where the concept 
comes from, in these views art is about the imposition of 
concept on the physical world, form on matter. (Note also 
that there is not yet a distinction between “fine arts” and 
crafts.) This also assumes that the process of innovation as 
creation is under control of the craftsman/artist—today the 
“designer”—who imposes on the material. The etymology 
of “design” also points in that direction, which has mean-
ings linked to marking, project, and purpose. The modern 
designer creates a concept, marks out a concept or scheme, 
which then gets realized and executed. The designer is in 
control of that idea; it is not dependent on its execution or 
whatever else happens with it.
For instance, according to these views, coding is seen as 
applied computer science that is very different from artistic 
practices and involves a know-how that is an application of 
theoretical knowledge gained in computer science. Artists, 
it seems, have no business in this process. Moreover, inno-
vation in this area, for instance the creation of a new app, is 
seen as creating a new concept which is then implemented 
in code and in hardware. The hardware is “passive”, so to 
speak. Another example is the invention and design of a 
new robot, which is also assumed to be the application of 
scientific knowledge and as the invention of a new concept, 
an idea, which then shapes matter in the sense that form 
is translated into code which in turn shapes material hard-
ware. In other words, in all these cases there is always a 
one-directional movement starting with the creator’s con-
cept and ending up in material reality, which is shaped by 
the innovator’s concept. Form is imposed on matter; human 
intention and imagination are materialized.
This essay challenges these assumptions by examin-
ing what kind of knowledge and practices are involved in 
art and in technological innovation. Drawing on work by 
Dewey, Heidegger, Latour, and Wittgenstein, it argues 
that technological innovation, if conceptualized as techne, 
can and must be understood as art and performance. It is 
argued that in practice technological innovation does not 
only involve episteme as theoretical knowledge and con-
cept (which is then applied, as in “forms shapes matter”) 
but also has the mode of poiesis, in which there is a kind 
of “dialogue” between form and matter, and between inno-
vator and environment, which is in some ways (but not in 
AI & Soc 
1 3
other ways) similar to natural growth. This understanding 
of technological innovation closely links it to art, which 
also involves poiesis. Further reflections on this concept 
lead to the thesis that technological innovation is not just 
the outcome of human design and intention but rather 
involves a performative process in which humans and non-
humans participate, and which is embedded in broader 
cultural patterns and grammars—and ultimately a form 
of life—that shape and make possible the innovation. The 
essay thus challenges those in academia and elsewhere who 
still hold on to the assumption that there is and should be a 
divorce between technological innovation and art, and con-
tributes to ongoing efforts in art, philosophy of technology, 
design, and elsewhere that try to reconcile what in practices 
and performances has never really been separated: art and 
technology, science and culture, subjects and objects.
First I question the separation between technological 
innovation and art by drawing on Dewey’s views, enabling 
us to see both art and technology as involving a similar 
kind of practice, which is inherently social. Also in this 
sense, they are not separate domains, as is often assumed in 
modernity. Stronger: science and technologies are branches 
of art. Then I turn to the ancient Greek terms techne and 
poiesis and to Heidegger and Latour to further develop a 
bridge between art and technology, and indeed a bridge 
between humans and non-humans. Technological innova-
tion turns out to be more poetical than usually assumed. 
Both technological innovation and art are seen as poetic 
and performative processes and practices. Finally, I use 
Wittgenstein to argue that practices of technological inno-
vation are embedded in wider cultural grammars, question-
ing again the so-called gap between science and society 
assumed in, for instance, discourse on responsible innova-
tion. While this discussion covers a rather wide range of 
thinkers and diversity of perspectives and deserves further 
development in a larger work, I show that we can already 
use these various conceptual building blocks to construct 
conceptual links between technological innovation and 
art. It is concluded that by using concepts such as practice, 
techne, poiesis, and form of life, technological innovation 
and art can be seen as having always been connected. It is 
hoped that this conceptual work helps justify, motivate, and 
support current efforts in art and science to create bridges 
between technological innovation and artistic practices.
2  Technology as art: thinking together art 
and technology with Dewey
In Experience and Nature (1925), Dewey questions the 
Western (in particular: ancient Greek, Platonic) identifica-
tion of knowledge with contemplation, which has led to the 
exclusion of ‘trial, work, manipulation and administration 
of things’ (p. 124). This exclusion is rooted in a metaphysi-
cal division between means and ends: things have always 
been seen as ‘slavish’ means, whereas ends are independ-
ent. The practice of knowing is seen as inferior, the use-
ful arts are ‘assigned a lower rank’ (p. 357). The division 
between means and ends also reflects a social division 
between ‘working and leisure classes’ (p.  368). Against 
this division, Dewey argues that ‘in the practice of sci-
ence, knowledge is an affair of making sure, not of grasping 
antecedently given sureties’ (p. 154). Against the view that 
knowledge is contemplation instead of ‘a productive art’ 
(p. 357), against the division between theory and practice, 
and against the division between the (practical) artistic and 
the (contemplative) aesthetic, between crafts and fine arts, 
Dewey puts the emphasis on art and sees science as art and 
practice:
It would then be seen that science is an art, that art is 
practice, and that the only distinction worth drawing 
is not between practice and theory, but between those 
modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inher-
ently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are 
full of enjoyed meanings. (…) Thus would disappear 
the separations that trouble present thinking: division 
of everything into nature and experience, of experi-
ence into practice and theory, art and science, of art 
into useful and fine, menial and free. (Dewey 1925, 
p. 358)
For Dewey, even thinking itself is an art: ‘knowledge of 
propositions which are the products of thinking, are works 
of art, as much so as statuary and symphonies’ (p.  378). 
Knowledge, then, is an art and an ‘act’ (p.  381), the act 
of knowing, which produces ‘new modes of interaction’ 
(p.  382). One could interpret this as saying that knowl-
edge and art, considered as practices, are performances 
leading to what Dewey calls ‘objective transformation’, 
which is ‘the method of action in the arts and sciences’ 
(pp. 345–346). If science is an art, then it must be placed 
within the history of arts:
The history of science in its distinct emergence from 
religious, ceremonial and poetic arts is the record of a 
differentiation of arts, not a record of separation from 
art. (Dewey 1925, p. 388)
For thinking about technological innovation and art, 
this view means at least the following. First, the separa-
tion between technological innovation and art is unfruitful, 
since both can be understood as arts, practices, and perfor-
mances, which must be placed within the history of a dif-
ferentiation of arts. In addition, if science is itself also a 
practice and an art, then science and technology should also 
not be seen in terms of theory and practice, contemplation 
and application, master and slave. Technological innovation 
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should then not be seen as ranking “lower” than science; it 
is not the servant of science who applies its theory and con-
cepts, but is another practice that also contributes to better 
knowledge and experience. Second, the Platonic concep-
tion of innovation and design as the creation of a detached 
concept (perhaps seen in contemplation), which is then put 
into practice, materialized, executed, and so on, must also 
be questioned. Instead, in this view successful innovation 
is a performance that necessarily involves practical work, 
performances with things, aimed at objective transforma-
tions. Then ‘trial, work, manipulation and administration of 
things’ is not to be seen as work that needs to be done by 
those who execute the design received from the innovator, 
designer, or artist—the “slaves” of the innovator, designer, 
or artist so to speak—but as makings necessary for the 
innovation itself. Moreover, this renders the process open 
to participation of users, who can participate in the making, 
which is part of the process of innovation and invention. It 
leads to a different view of innovation that is more partici-
pative and inclusive and hence has the potential of social 
transformation.
It is also a view that ties in with visions of responsible 
innovation (e.g. Von Schomberg 2013) that stress partici-
pation of stakeholders, public engagement, and democ-
racy (e.g. Owen et  al. 2012), and with the recent history 
of participative research, based on the recognition or even 
moral and political ‘imperative’ that humans have the fun-
damental right to contribute to decisions that affect them 
(Reason 1998). The difference with the proposed concep-
tion of innovation, however, is that here participation is not 
an imperative that needs to be added from the “outside”, 
so to speak, but is rather seen a feature of good innovation, 
design, and art itself: a necessary feature of innovation as 
performance.
Whereas this non-Platonic and more egalitarian concep-
tion of innovation and art is relatively unknown by the gen-
eral public, we see that both in art and in innovation artists 
and designers increasingly work like this. They may have 
“concepts”, but these concepts interact with, and at least 
partly emerge from, concrete engagement with the mate-
rial and from collaborations with production and with peo-
ple busy with production. For instance, today innovative 
architecture—itself a practice on the border between art 
and innovation—often includes engagement with the ‘trial, 
work, manipulation and administration of things’ at various 
stages of production of a building. The architect is then no 
longer a Platonic concept-contemplator but becomes more 
like a participant in a more inclusive performative process 
that leads to objective transformation. Another example is 
when the design of an artefact/work of art involves interac-
tion between an initial concept of a particular artist and col-
laborations with people at various places in the world that 
result in an artefact/work of art (or several works of art) that 
is more than mere “executions” of a pre-established idea. 
To the extent that this happens (the Platonic conception is 
still very influential), these artists-innovators continue a 
long history of the arts (in the plural), which is not so much 
about contemplation but about practical-experiential pro-
cesses involving different kinds of know-how and practical 
experience—know-how and work that is linked to all kinds 
of people and skills, which work together more or less on a 
basis of equality. Moreover, we can then also recognize that 
design, art, and “even” science are collaborative practices 
involving know-how and implicit, ‘tacit’ knowledge and 
intuition (Polanyi 1966a, b) based on practical experience 
and collaboration with others—going against the tendency 
of designers to assert their individual role (Rust 2004). And 
as said, users can also take part in these innovation pro-
cesses, since in this approach their experience matters.
3  Techne as poiesis: using Heidegger and Latour 
to conceptualize practices of technological 
innovation as a poetic, participative, 
performative, and political process involving 
humans and non‑humans
Another way to bring together technological innovation and 
art, and to further develop the Deweyan view presented in 
the previous section, is to further reflect on the Greek terms 
techne and poiesis (here with the help of Heidegger) and to 
link both Heidegger and Dewey to Latour.
Technological innovation refers to the term “technol-
ogy”, which in turn is rooted in the ancient Greek term 
“techne”. The term techne can be interpreted as techno-
logos in the sense that there is “first” a logos, which then 
materialized and executed. In other words, it can be con-
ceptualized in terms of Platonic design as outlined above. 
However, it can also be interpreted as a kind of poiesis. Let 
me develop this by drawing on Heidegger.
The ancient Greeks distinguished between physics, 
techne, and poiesis. The usual translation/interpretation 
of these terms goes as follows: Physis refers to change in 
non-human nature which is not under human control (for 
instance growth), whereas techne is a kind of making that 
involves a human goal and intention. Poiesis, then, can 
be defined as a mix of physics and techne: from techne it 
has the aspect of human making, but at the same time the 
process of making is not entirely under human control—
like in physis. However, is techne really only about human 
intention? Is techne to be interpreted as human design? In 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (1977), Heidegger 
argues that techne belongs to poiesis since, like physis, it 
has ‘the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. 
the bursting of a blossom into bloom’ (Heidegger 1977, 
p. 10) but in contrast to physics this bursting open does not 
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happen ‘in itself’ but ‘in another (en alloi), in the crafts-
man or artist’ (p. 11). This conception of techne still relates 
techne to a human craftsman or artist, but interestingly 
here the human is a mere participant in the artistic/techne 
process. The work of art or the artefact is not exclusively 
the result of human intention, it also involves—so we may 
interpret Heidegger—the “participation” of the material. 
There is a process of making and revealing in which both 
humans and non-humans take part.
Heidegger uses this view of techne within his more 
general argument about modern technology, which con-
trasts modern technology with the ancient craft work. But 
whether or not we accept his particular view of modern 
technology (I will argue that modern technological innova-
tion is less modern than it seems), his conception of techne 
as poiesis can help us further develop the Deweyean view 
presented in the previous section. Like Dewey, Heidegger 
points to a time when ‘the arts were not derived from the 
artistic. Art works were not enjoyed aesthetically’ (p. 34)—
in other words, to a time when there was not yet a division 
between aesthetic contemplation and art as practice. There 
were artistic-technical practices. According to Heidegger, 
this changes in modern times. But with Dewey and, as I 
will show now, with Latour, we can argue that we still have 
techne, that also modern technology depends on techne, 
understood as poiesis, that we have never been modern—
to use Latour’s phrase (Latour 1993). In particular, we can 
use Heidegger to emphasize that also today technological 
innovation, like art, is not what we moderns (and we Pla-
tonists) take it to be. We believe that technological innova-
tion, design, and art is all about creating a concept, which 
then gets materialized; that there is an idea which then 
needs slaves to become material objects. But we can inter-
pret Dewey, Heidegger, and Latour as implying that instead 
there is, and always has been, a practical-performative pro-
cess in which both humans and non-humans participate, 
and which is not totally in control of the human and not 
entirely a result of human goals and intentions. In other 
words, if the techne involved in technological innovation is 
not fundamentally different from that involved in art, tech-
nological innovation is more poetical than assumed. There 
is a transformative and revealing encounter with matter, 
or “dialogue” with matter, in a process and performance 
of poetical bringing-forth, in which human will and inten-
tion does not necessarily play the major part. In innovation, 
there is rather a responding to the material and a participa-
tion in a process of unfolding.
This less modern understanding of innovation and 
art—indeed innovation as art and as poetic techne—is in 
line with Latour (1993, 2004), who has interpreted sci-
ence and society in a way that, like Dewey, questions 
modern distinctions between nature and the social, and 
helps us bring together humans and non-humans in our 
conception of technological innovation as art. Latour has 
argued that in spite of modern attempts to “purify” sci-
ence and society, scientists have always created hybrids of 
nature and culture, nature, and the social (Latour 1993). 
He arrived at this view by studying concrete practices and 
networks in the laboratories of scientists, where he found 
non-modern hybridity rather than “things-in-themselves” 
or “society” (p.  25). He sees ‘nature-cultures’ and ‘col-
lectives’ (Latour 2004, p.  45), ‘assemblages of humans 
and nonhumans’ (p. 52). The social is made up of actors 
and ‘actants’ (pp. 76–77). Thus, the social involves both 
humans and non-humans, and science can once again be 
seen as a practice and a craft. Furthermore, at the level of 
interaction with technology in such craft work, there may 
also be hybridization between humans and things, as Ver-
beek (2014) has stressed with regard to design. Humans 
and non-humans may interact in various ways, and this 
can include merging and immersion; this process does 
not only constitute (non-human) objects but also (human) 
subjects. To conclude, like in Dewey the claim is that 
modern distinctions and divisions do not hold once we 
look at the level of practice and (I add) performance.
Indeed, using Pickering (1995) we can stress the per-
formative aspects of Latour’s view of the social: instead 
of a static ontology, we can see science as performances 
involving both ‘human and material agency’ (Picker-
ing 1995, p.  21), constituting ‘a posthumanist space, a 
space in which the human actors are still there but now 
inextricably entangled with the nonhuman, no longer at 
the center of the action and calling the shots. The world 
makes us in one and the same process as we make the 
world’ (p. 26). In this view, humans and machines ‘col-
laborate in performances’ (p.  16); science becomes ‘a 
dance of agency’ (p.  21). Material agency is entangled 
with human agency, and neither is reducible to the other 
(p. 54). Humans plan and have goals and intentions, but 
in practice there is ‘interplay here between the emergence 
of material agency and the construction of human goals’ 
(p. 56).
For Latour, this also raises political questions regard-
ing the voice of things (Latour 2004). Like Dewey asked 
the question regarding equality of humans, on the basis of 
Latour’s view the question regarding equality of humans 
and non-humans can be raised: if both humans and non-
humans play this more “active” role not only in science but 
also in the social more generally, is it right that we see our-
selves as the masters of things, that we see things as our 
slaves? (And maybe this question is even more Deweyan 
than expected, if we interpret his remark about means and 
ends, where means are seen as slaves, as not only a political 
gesture concerning relations between humans but also as 
concerning non-humans. Did Dewey argue for a liberation 
of the means, and can this be interpreted not only as a call 
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for liberation of human workers but also as a call for libera-
tion of things in a Latourian sense?)
Applying this view of science to innovation and art, 
this approach means that in practice both innovation and 
art are to be understood as involving actors and ‘actants’. 
Then material things are no longer merely “passive” recipi-
ents of a “concept” or “design” imposed by the (contem-
plative, intuitive, perhaps also: “genius”) innovator or art-
ist, but play a more “active” role in the innovative-artistic 
practices and performances from which an innovative arte-
fact or original work of art emerges. There is one space in 
which there is human agency and material agency. Goals 
of humans, “concepts”, “designs”, etc. still play a role. But 
the actual innovation and the actual work of art emerge 
through dances and dialectics between human and non-
human performances. The artist responds to the material. 
And the material may cooperate or resist, afford certain 
things rather than others, move in certain directions rather 
than others, etc. The material—if we must use the term at 
all—thus “co-designs” the product. Moreover, Latour’s 
view, like Dewey’s, also helps us connect this poetic, per-
formative, and non-modern epistemology to the question 
concerning the social. With Latour, we can go further than 
Dewey (or indeed fully understand and think through the 
radicality of Dewey’s project) and see the social no longer 
in exclusively human terms, but also add non-humans to 
the social. The result is a view of innovation and art which 
does not only raise social and political questions about, 
for instance, equality between humans, but also asks about 
the social relation between humans and non-humans (at 
least if and in so far they are not merged). Should things 
be mere slaves and receptacles of our will, intention, and 
“concepts”, or should we see them as a kind of “partners” 
(dance partners, performance partners) when it comes to 
technological and artistic innovation, understood as poie-
sis? Whether or not we endorse the second view, at least 
this approach raises the question, which is an epistemologi-
cal and a social question at the same time. Again questions 
regarding knowledge are seen as intrinsically connected to 
the social question, and questions regarding “technologi-
cal” innovation turn out to be, at the same time, questions 
regarding social transformation.
4  Innovation as performance embedded in a form 
of life: using Wittgenstein to connect practices 
of technological innovation to wider cultural 
grammars
We can also say more about the social dimension of inno-
vation as practice, art, and poiesis by using Wittgenstein. 
With Dewey, Heidegger, and Latour, we have already 
arrived at a more holistic and social view of innovation: 
innovation is indeed something “technical”, but if we 
understand the techne in the ways I proposed, then this 
“technical” innovation is linked to larger epistemic and 
social processes and challenges. It is no longer about 
detached contemplation or creation of a “concept” alien-
ated from practical, material, and social reality and per-
formances. It is not a theoretical matter divorced from the 
practical dances and mangles (to use Pickering’s term) with 
material things. It is also not about “art” if “art” is under-
stood in terms of aesthetic contemplation or the “fine” arts 
as opposed to crafts. It is also not about science if science 
is understood in a theoretical-contemplative way. Instead, 
it is about knowledge, science, and art at work, about skill 
and know-how, about making truth, about knowing (verb) 
and about social transformation.
This interpretation can be further elaborated using Witt-
genstein’s view of language and applying it to technology 
and technological innovation. In the Philosophical Investi-
gations (2009), Wittgenstein argued that language must be 
understood in analogy to the use of tools:
Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, 
pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, 
nails and screws—The functions of words are as 
diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both 
cases there are similarities.) (Wittgenstein 2009, § 11, 
p. 9e)
He also calls language ‘an instrument’: ‘Language is an 
instrument. Its concepts are instruments’ (§ 569, p. 159e). 
According to Wittgenstein, language is about use. It is use 
that gives signs life and breath (§ 432, p. 135e). But, inter-
estingly, for Wittgenstein this use is always related to larger 
wholes and contexts. In particular, he argues that use of 
words is linked to ‘language-games’ and a ‘form of life’: 
He writes:
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and 
the activities into which it is woven, a “language-
game”. (§ 7, p. 8e)
According to Wittgenstein, our use of language is 
shaped by the activities and games we play, which itself has 
a larger context, a ‘form of life’:
to imagine a language means to imagine a form of 
life. (§ 19, 11e)
If we learn a language, we do not use theoretical 
knowledge. We learn language in the same way as we 
learn other skills, which are always linked to activities, 
social games, and a form of life. These activities and 
games have rules and one must know some things. But 
what kind of knowledge, exactly, is required? In On Cer-
tainty (1969), Wittgenstein suggests that we do not need 
theoretical knowledge in our everyday lives in order to 
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learn language and the social life, but rather—and here 
he is in line with Dewey—we need experience. Learning 
a language is a matter of mastery: to master a language-
game is to be able to do certain things (§  534, p.  71e). 
This does not require theoretical knowledge (which can 
then be doubted); instead, we lead our lives while ‘being 
content to accept many things’ (§  344, p.  44e), without 
having certainty. Moreover, against the stress on rule in 
the later Wittgenstein (or at least in many of his inter-
preters) but in line with Polanyi, we must stress that not 
all knowledge can be made explicit. Language, but also 
the grammars in which it is embedded such as games and 
a form of life, is a matter of know-how, which can only 
partly be formalized.
This is a view about language (and, like Dewey, Hei-
degger, and Latour, a view about epistemology), but I pro-
pose we can turn Wittgenstein’s metaphor around and use 
it to say something meaningful about technology and tech-
nological innovation. Technology, if understood as the use 
of tools, can also be linked to activities, games, and forms 
of life. The use of tools is not isolated from the practical 
and social life, but is instead part of it and shaped by it. 
Learning to use a technology is like learning to use a lan-
guage: it requires skill, but this “technical” skill is not iso-
lated from larger social wholes. Instead, using a technology 
requires experience, which is always at the same time a 
social experience, since use of the technology is connected 
to games and, ultimately, to a form of life. Use of technol-
ogy, then, is always shaped and made possible by larger 
social “grammars”. [Consider also Wittgenstein’s use of the 
term grammar, in particular ‘depth grammar’ (Wittgenstein 
2009, § 664, pp. 176e–177e).] Technology use is related to 
a larger social–cultural whole, to “how we do things”. Tak-
ing into account Polanyi’s point, however, we must add that 
we can try to make these grammars explicit, but that there 
is also a lot of implicit knowledge involved in this know-
ing how to use technology. Moreover, elaborating Wittgen-
stein’s insights we can say that the games and grammars, in 
which technology is embedded and by which it is shaped, 
are always also normative. This normativity can be explicit, 
in the form of rules (and indeed in the later Wittgenstein 
the stress is on rules), or it can be implicit, in the form of 
ways of doing things and in the form of cultural meanings, 
values, and other “grammars” that are not always made 
explicit.
This use of Wittgenstein for thinking about technol-
ogy (see also Coeckelbergh 2017) is in line with Winner’s 
application of Wittgenstein’s concept ‘form of life’ to tech-
nology. In ‘Technologies as Forms of life’ (2014), Winner 
argued that technologies ‘become woven into the texture of 
everyday existence’ and then ‘shed their tool-like qualities 
to become part of our very humanity’ (Winner 2014, p. 55). 
They bring about ‘significant alterations in patterns of 
human activity and human institutions’: technologies make 
‘new worlds’ (p. 54):
We do indeed “use” telephones, automobiles, elec-
tric lights, and computers in the conventional sense 
of picking them up and putting them down. But our 
world soon becomes one in which telephony, automo-
bility, electric lighting, and computing are forms of 
life in the most powerful sense: life would scarcely be 
thinkable without them. (Winner 2014, p. 54)
At the same time, the forms of life in which new tech-
nologies enter and are embedded also shape our use. There 
are already older cultural and social patters. Winner gives 
the example of our use of computers:
Forms of life that we mastered before the coming of 
the computer shape our expectations as we begin to 
use the instrument. One strategy of software design, 
therefore, tries to “humanize” the computers by hav-
ing them say “Hello” when the user logs in or hav-
ing them respond with witty remarks when a person 
makes an error. We carry with us highly structured 
anticipations about entities that appear to participate, 
if only minimally, in forms of life and associated lan-
guage games that are parts of human culture. (Winner 
2014, p. 56)
Thus, we must place technologies in the context of the 
‘vast multiplicity of cultural practices that comprise our 
common world’ (p. 57). They are not only “technical”, or 
rather, because they are “technical”, they also shape our 
world and our thinking. Winner suggests that the way peo-
ple talk about themselves has been influenced by the com-
puter, for instance when we compare the mind to a com-
puter (p. 58).
Applied to technological innovation, then, this Wittgen-
steinian view implies that innovation and art must them-
selves be understood as involving the use of tools, and that 
in this respect they are linked to activities, games, and a 
form of life. These games and forms of life shape, structure, 
and make possible the innovation, and bring with them par-
ticular meanings, expectations, and normativities. Innova-
tion should not be reduced to the (conceptual or contempla-
tive) “act” of the innovator; instead, if we understand it in 
practical terms as proposed in the previous sections, and if 
we then conceptualize this practice as use understood in a 
Wittgensteinian sense, we can conclude that innovation is 
always embedded in the ‘vast multiplicity of cultural prac-
tices that comprise our common world’ (to use Winner’s 
phrase again), embedded in activities, games, and a form 
of life. (And the same could be said about art, or rather: 
about other arts.) If we want to arrive at a more compre-
hensive conception of technological innovation, then we 
also have to include the structures and “grammars” that 
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shape it, and that are in turn shaped by the innovation. If 
technological innovation is a matter of “design” at all and 
involves the use of “concepts”, that design and those con-
cepts are not to be seen as a creation ex nihilo, but as uses 
and performances that participate in games and in a larger 
social–cultural whole that always precede the innovative 
“act” and structure it. Innovation might be a matter of per-
formance and agency, but it is always a performance that 
is inscribed, prescribed, and “co-scripted” by those larger 
wholes. Therefore, the epistemology of technological 
innovation should not only be formulated in terms of per-
sonal experience, learning, and skill, but also a particular 
“local” practice and poetic process. That personal experi-
ence and “local” technical-poetic experience, process, and 
performance are always shaped by what is already given: 
in existing games, in a form of life, in all kinds of gram-
mars that structure and make possible the particular inno-
vation. Again the demiurge model of innovation and inven-
tion, and especially the creation ex nihilo interpretation 
of that demiurge model, is challenged. If we must use the 
figure of the demiurge at all, the demiurge act of creation 
and design needs to be made practical and performative, 
rather than Platonic and contemplative, and it needs to be 
emphasized—here by using Dewey, Heidegger, and Witt-
genstein—that the creation is not ex nihilo and independ-
ent, but instead responds to the material and to social and 
cultural structures that are already in place “before” there is 
the act of creation.
Both the Deweyean and the Wittgensteinian approach 
to innovation proposed here thus question the assumption, 
widely held in STS and in discourses about responsibility 
innovation, that there is a gap between science and society. 
There is no gap in the sense that innovations are always 
already embedded in social forms and structures. If there 
are problems that are framed in terms of a gap, these prob-
lems are only possible since there is already a connection. 
For instance, if technological innovation is said to be mov-
ing away from social values, then this has not only to do 
with innovation, but with what happens in society and to 
the values in society. Value changes in society make pos-
sible value changes in innovation.
Furthermore, for the views of technological innovation 
articulated in the previous sections, this support for yet 
another “social” conceptualization of the technical and of 
innovation also means that although technological innova-
tion has always the potential of social transformation (since 
it is already social by nature), at a fundamental level there 
cannot be a radical transformation. If one wished to change 
the master–slave situation mentioned before (a desire for 
change that is perhaps inspired by Dewey and Latour), for 
instance, and indeed if one wished to change the very way 
we think about means and ends, nature and society, and so 
on, then one must bear in mind that the given structures 
and grammars exert a powerful influence on our innova-
tions and on us—including a normative influence. Radical 
change seems to be difficult then, if not impossible.
On the other hand, if we understand innovation in a 
more practical and performative sense, as proposed in the 
previous sections, then there is some hope for concrete (but 
perhaps smaller) changes. If we do not understand innova-
tion in terms of an idea or concept (e.g. the idea to liber-
ate human and non-human slaves) which then needs to 
get executed (and which then turns out to be difficult), but 
instead understand it in terms of material-social practices 
and performances, then one could conclude that the only 
truly innovative in both technical and social senses can 
only happen in these practices and performances, which 
will always involve “local” dialogues and interactions with 
things and people, but which will also always necessarily 
involve dialogue and interaction with the social and cultural 
“grammars” that shape these practices and performances. 
New innovative practices may then slightly alter the rel-
evant games and form of life, which should not be reified 
but which “live” only in and as practices—including tech-
nological, artistic, and design practices. But this kind of 
change is a slow process which has uncertain and unpre-
dictable outcomes. It seems that this is the “only” way 
social transformation can happen.
It is also probably the best way. Even if it was possible 
to turn around every stone (to paraphrase Popper), even if it 
was possible to impose one’s concept of social transforma-
tion onto the material and social world, such a Platonic and 
totalitarian act would be very dangerous and undesirable. 
Politically speaking, the approach to technological innova-
tion and art presented here intends to enable a non-totali-
tarian approach to social change and transformation. Since 
it is explicitly opposed to total and Platonic design, it is 
also non-utopian in Popper’s sense articulated in The Open 
Society and Its Enemies (1962). Popper read in Plato ‘the 
sweep of Utopianism, its attempt to deal with society as a 
whole, leaving no stone unturned’ (Popper 1962, p. 7). This 
is not the kind of innovation we want or need, although on 
the basis of what I said here we must reject Popper’s alter-
native: a ‘completely abstract or depersonalized society’ 
(p. 174). The approach I propose questions both the totali-
tarian and the abstracting aspects of Plato.
5  Conclusion: technological innovation as a poetic, 
participative, and performative process vital 
for cultural‑technological change
In this essay, I have attempted to conceptualize a bridge 
between technological innovation and art. Using Dewey, 
Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, I have interpreted technologi-
cal innovation as a poetic, participative, and performative 
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process, which is always already connected to a wider cul-
tural context, which makes possible and constrains that 
process. This has yielded a conception of innovation that 
goes against a long-standing and ancient tradition, which 
holds a dualistic view of innovation as involving a split 
between, on the one hand, an idea, model, concept, etc. 
and, on the other hand, material reality formed by that con-
cept. Instead, in the approach I propose, there is a kind of 
“dialogue” between concept and material, mind and mat-
ter. Moreover, both my application of Wittgenstein’s term 
form of life and the idea of innovation as techne and poie-
sis (inspired by Heidegger) also imply that humans have 
not complete control over innovation: it is a participative, 
social, and cultural process which depends on larger cul-
tural structures and which involves human and non-human 
performances. Technological innovation is also not a static 
affair but a process, and with Dewey we can say that it is a 
practical affair which is very similar, if not identical, to art. 
Indeed, technological innovation and science can be seen 
as branches of the development of the arts. This means that 
current efforts in both art and science/technology to bridge 
the gap between these two domains can be supported and 
justified by a coherent argument about the nature of, and 
relation between, technological innovation and art. I have 
presented such an argument here, and I have shown that 
and how we can use a variety of philosophical–theoreti-
cal resources to support it. While of course more work is 
required to further develop these various conceptual routes, 
I hope that the present text may contribute to current dis-
courses and ongoing and growing practical efforts in the 
arts and in technological innovation that also try to build 
bridges. Such efforts and experiments, then, are neither 
a luxury or a marginal hobby, nor are they exceptional or 
new; they are instead central to what innovation, understood 
as techne and poiesis, is all about. Finally, based on Dewey 
and Latour we can understand the transformative potential 
of technological innovation in and for society; however, 
with Heidegger and Wittgenstein we should also acknowl-
edge that this social change, through innovation, has its 
limits, since there is already a given culture, a form of life, 
which constrains—but also makes possible—innovation.
For ethics of technology and for responsible innova-
tion, for instance, this approach means that we have now 
more fundamental support for the claim that designers, 
engineers, artists, and so on should be held responsible for 
what they do and that they should think about ethics and 
responsibility before and when they design and innovation. 
We can now explain and justify this claim by saying that 
they have this responsibility precisely since innovation is 
intrinsically material and social: if we understand innova-
tion as already itself social, then innovation has already the 
potential of, and contribution to, social transformation. Yet 
at the same time this link with the material and social also 
presents limits: if innovation is a participative process that 
is (1) not entirely under human control and (2) certainly not 
entirely under individual control since embedded in broader 
and larger social–cultural–material patterns and structures, 
then a discourse about individual human responsibility is 
not sufficient. There should be more attention to the mate-
rial, technological dimension of innovation poetics—to the 
participation of the technologies and their normative impli-
cations—and to the evaluation of the larger societal institu-
tions and cultural patters, indeed the entire form of life, in 
which the innovation is embedded. For instance, evaluating 
gender bias in the design of devices for the household must 
be connected with an evaluation of institutions and soci-
etal structures (e.g. power structures); innovation is never 
isolated from such larger patterns. Games and forms of life 
have normative implications for innovation, art, and design. 
Therefore, ethics and politics of technological innovation 
cannot be content with only studying material artefacts, as 
the empirical turn in philosophy of technology proposed. 
Instead, material artefacts have to be understood as intrin-
sically connected to larger social and cultural wholes and 
patterns. If there is such a thing as the normative or moral-
ity of artefacts, then it is a normativity and morality that is 
deeply connected with “the way we do things” in particular 
social and cultural games and in a particular form of life. 
Those games and that form of life also need to be studied 
and evaluated. This renders philosophy and ethics of tech-
nology more critical and might contribute to technological-
societal change.
That being said, we should again acknowledge limita-
tions to change: if, based on our evaluation, we want to 
change those games and that form of life, that may turn out 
to be very difficult. We can try, with new discourses, and 
especially with new practices, for instance artistic prac-
tices, innovation practices, and design practices (indeed 
discourse is not enough). However, such efforts at innova-
tion and change have only limited effects on our form of 
life, since they are themselves shaped by larger “gram-
mars”. On the account presented, then, it may well be true 
that art can change the world, and that design can change 
the world. But such change is only possible if there are suf-
ficient shifts in the entire holistic configurations in which 
individual and human material-poetic performances par-
ticipate. Going against our modern(ist) desires and intui-
tions, we should acknowledge that such shifts are always 
limited and that radical technological-cultural change is 
neither possible nor desirable. To think that we can turn all 
the stones at once is a dangerous illusion that has brought 
much misery and suffering to humankind. We better start 
with shifting a few pebbles.
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